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Abstract
I argue (1) that what (ontic) New Mechanistic philosophers of science call
mechanisms would be material Gestalten, and (2) that Merleau-Ponty’s en-
gagement with Gestalt theory can help us frame a standing challenge against
ontic conceptions of mechanisms. In short, until the (ontic) New Mechanist
can provide us with a plausible account of the organization of mechanisms as
an objective feature of mind-independent ontic structures in the world which
we might discover – and no ontic Mechanist has done so – it is more conser-
vative to claim that mechanistic’ organization is instead a mind-dependent
aspect of our epistemic strategies of mechanistic explanation.
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1. Introduction
In early work, New Mechanistic philosophers of biology seemed to promote
what Wesley Salmon (1984a) called an ontic view of explanation. In an ontic
view (roughly), the explanation of a phenomenon is, most fundamentally, the
mind-independent ontic structure(s) in the world that causes, constitutes, or
is otherwise responsible for the occurrence of the phenomenon. Ontic Mech-
anists hold that mechanisms are such structures. This view has been further
articulated and promoted by Craver (2007, 2014). An alternative is what
Salmon called an epistemic view, in which (roughly) explanations are, most
fundamentally, mind-dependent strategies of making phenomena intelligible,
predictable, or understandable. According to robust epistemic Mechanists,
mechanisms are theoretically constructed as part of such a strategy (cf. Bech-
tel & Abrahamsen 2005, Bechtel 2015).
Here I invoke the history of philosophy to articulate what is today a novel
challenge to ontic Mechanists. First (S2) I argue that the ontic Mechanists’
ontological commitment to mechanisms is equivalent to the the Gestaltists’
commitment to what they called “physical Gestalten” – what I call “material
Gestalten” (Ko¨hler 1920; Koffka 1936).1 I show that Mechanists endorse a
form of holism regarding mechanisms’ organization and constitution. Just
such holism, I argue, is what the Berlin Gestaltists highlighted when distin-
guishing material Gestalten from mere “and-summations.” Mechanisms, if
they exist in the world, are material Gestalten.
I then (S3) show that this ontological commitment has been poorly un-
derstood by Mechanists themselves. In short, there is consensus that con-
stitutive relations within organized mechanisms (between parts and whole)
should be understood non-causally, but no ontological analysis of them has
attained consensus. This leads to a puzzle: how can ontic Mechanists jus-
tify commitment to the holistic organization of mechanisms, when leading
accounts of Mechanistic explanation seem offer no specification of what it is,
exactly, to which we are allegedly ontologically committed?
Finally (S4), I adapt Merleau-Ponty’s argument against the Gestaltists to
challenge the ontic Mechanists’ understanding of our ontological commitment
to material Gestalten. Merleau-Ponty’s own argument involved claims which
many authors today may not endorse, but I disentangle his core criticism.
1I focus on the Berlin School of Gestalt theory, not the Austrian school of von Ehrenfels
and Meinong: see Smith (1988, p.150).
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According to Merleau-Ponty’s core criticism, we do not discover material
Gestalten through scientific research, and conducting scientific research does
not itself incur any ontological commitment to organized Gestalten. Instead,
(a) we assume in advance that some of the systems we study should be
understood as organized wholes, and (b) that assumption is never discharged
by some scientific demonstration that it holds true.
I claim that Merleau-Ponty helps us offer a diagnosis of why it has proven
so difficult for the New Mechanists to provide any clear ontological account
of mechanisms’ organization: this ontological commitment cannot be spelled
out in an ontic view of Mechanistic explanation, since it is presupposed by
the ontic Mechanist from the outset. Moreover, I claim Merleau-Ponty helps
us frame a moderate position which lets us evade the problem of analyzing
mechanisms’ organization. Absent any objective analysis of mechanisms’
organization, we may more moderately maintain that such organization is
simply a subjective feature of how we apprehend mechanistic phenomena:
it is a mind-dependent feature of epistemic strategies of explanation, not a
mind-independent feature of the world. The basic claims required for this
view are essentially already expressed in strong forms of the epistemic view
of Mechanistic explanation (cf. Bechtel 2015). Thus, exploring the historical
engagement between Merleau-Ponty and Gestalt theory helps us frame a
standing challenge against ontic conceptions of mechanisms.
2. Mechanisms are Material Gestalten
In this section I argue that ontic mechanisms are material Gestalten. Bring-
ing this to light requires completing three tasks. First (S2.1) I review a com-
mon conception of Gestalten as only perceptual-phenomenal entities. Second
(S2.2) I re-introduce the under-appreciated notion of material Gestalten, and
clarify the role they were intended to play in the Gestaltists’ psycho-physical
explanation of perceptual experience. As I shall clarify, the Gestaltists en-
dorsed two claims as characteristic of all Gestalten:
Holistic Individuation (HI): There exist parts and/or prop-
erties that are individuated only when they occur in some whole
(i.e., as dependents parts of some Gestalt).
Holistic Explanation (HE): There exist wholes (i.e., Gestal-
ten) whose parts exhibit behaviors or properties which are only
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explicable given properties of the whole.2
The Gestaltists held that HI and HE characterized not only the organized
whole-objects of perceptual experience, but also the organization of material
structures. Relations between these different varieties of Gestalten were key
to the Gestaltist’s proposed model of psycho-physical explanation. I do not
intend to promote the Gestaltist’s own view of psycho-physical explanation,
but discuss it in some detail to clarify the basic features of material Gestalten:
the question of whether there exist material Gestalten can be decoupled from
the explantatory purposes to which Gestaltists put them.
Finally I clarify foundational commitments regarding the organization of
mechanisms, and I argue that the New Mechanists are likewise committed
to HI (S2.3) and HE (S2.4): mechanisms are Gestalten.
2.1. Perceptual-phenomenal Gestalten
In contemporary philosophy, “Gestalten” are typically understood as cer-
tain perceptual-phenomenal structures.3 For example, Grush4 provides the
“illusory contours” figure below, then invokes a perceptual-phenomenal con-
ception of Gestalten when he comments:
“...the explanation would appear to be that some-
thing about the stimulus conditions triggers the per-
ceptual system to construct a representation other
than the one that accurately reflects what is be-
ing presented... The various Gestalt criteria can be
given explanations in these terms... What this sug-
gests is that the content of perceptual experience is
not a mere passive registration of external events,
but involves some degree of active construction...”
(Grush, 2008, 150).
2I am indebted to Chudnoff (2013) for helping me see the distinction between HI and
HE, though he does not frame it quite as I do.
3As illustration, the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (1999) provides no general
entry for “Gestalten,” referring the reader to (i) an entry on figure-ground phenomena in
perception, and (ii) a short bio of Ko¨hler.
4I do not accuse Grush himself of having an over-narrow view of Gestalten. I simply
borrow his claims to illustrate what such a narrow view would look like.
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We can make limited headway in understanding the original conception of
Gestalten using this case. First, recall the Gestaltists’ thesis of HI:
Holistic Individuation (HI): There exist parts and/or prop-
erties that are individuated only when they occur in some whole
(i.e., as dependents parts of some Gestalt).
HI is the claim that the individuation of some entities is dependent upon their
role in a whole. Here “individuation” in meant in a metaphysical sense, not
a cognitive or epistemic sense (Lowe, 2003). Epistemically, we individuate
objects by distinguishing them from others – for disambiguation, I call this
“identification.” Metaphysically, an object is individuated by what makes it
the object it is, distinct in its being from others. In our perception of this
illusory contours figure, there is a straightforward sense in which HI holds
true. Viewing the figure, we tend to experience a white square, flanked at
each corner by occluded black circles. Experiencing the figure of a square
requires experiencing its (illusory) edges. What is perceptually “filled in”
appears (fleetingly) as edges-of-a-square, not free-floating “lines.” The indi-
viduation of the edges as edges-of-a-square requires their participation in a
whole square, in accordance with HI. I take it that this application of HI is
relatively straightforward.
HE is another matter:
Holistic Explanation (HE): There exist wholes (i.e., Gestal-
ten) whose parts exhibit behaviors or properties which are only
explicable given properties of the whole
Applied here, HE means that experiencing apparent edges is in some sense
explained by properties of one’s whole experience when viewing this figure.
Grush sketches the more common approach: we explain the experience of
edges by appeal to properties of the stimulus and of sub-personal processing.
How might the Gestaltist invoke HE? As Chudnoff clarifies, the Gestaltists
pursued a kind of phenomenological explanation, captured by the (some-
what cryptic) doctrine of the Law of Pra¨gnanz (2013, p.176).5 The Law of
Pra¨gnanz holds that our perceptual experience tends to be as “good” (regu-
lar, symmetric, simplistic) as it can be, even if this requires that our expe-
rience be an inaccurate representation of stimuli. For the illusory contours
5I depart from Chudnoff in what follows: he discusses only phenomenal Gestalten.
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figure, suppose an experience of a white square occluding four black circles
is simpler than an experience of four un-occluded Pac-Man shapes oriented
toward the center of the figure. If that were so, and if the Law of Pra¨gnanz
held good, we could invoke it to provide a kind of explanation (an answer
to a why-question). Why do we experience illusory edges? Because that is
part of the simplest whole-experience we can have, faced with this stimulus.
On this view, “a property of the whole [experience] – greater simplicity in
organization – explains a property of the part” (Chudnoff, 2013, p.176).
2.2. Material Gestalten
In my view, the foregoing is not the full account of the Gestaltists’ ex-
planation of this case, and this is because a narrow, perceptual-phenomenal
understanding of Gestalten does not fully capture the notion.
In his Principles of Gestalt Psychology, Koffka introduced Gestalt theory
as a new worldview which promised, among other things, (a) a new under-
standing of the nature of facts, theories and science, (b) a comprehensive in-
tegration of quantity, order, and meaning (value) into a unified ontology, and
(c) a novel resolution of the materialist-vitalist debate in early 20th century
biology.6 The notion of material Gestalten can be introduced in connection
with this last issue. The Gestaltist aims to resolve the materialism-vitalism
debate by showing that the kind of “order” which the vitalist claimed to
uniquely characterize living systems is not unreal, not the result of some “vi-
tal force,” but rather (in a basic form) already present in inanimate physical
systems (Koffka 1936, p.17). This approach was pursued emphatically in
Ko¨hler’s (1920) Physical Gestalten in Rest and Stationary State: the notion
of Gestalten was extended to the material world itself, to characterize orderly
systems at large. To illustrate this view, I sketch the Gestaltist’s complete
view of psycho-physical explanation.
Recognizing material (more specifically, physical) Gestalten is construed
as affirmatively answering the question “Are there physical whole-states or
whole structures in which the parts are not mere and-summations [Und-
verbindungen]... of elementary individual states and individual structures?”
6In the materialist-vitalist debate, the materialist was often a classical mechanist: these
must be contrasted with the New Mechanists who are my interlocutors here.
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(Ko¨hler, 1920, p.25/42).7 We can specify what this question (and its answer)
amounts to by clarifying the concept of an “and-summation”:
“An aggregate [Zusammen] of ‘parts’ or ‘pieces’ is a pure ‘sum-
mation’ [eine reine “Summe”] only when its constituents may be
added together one after another without thereby causing any al-
teration in any of them; and conversely, a summation is that kind
of aggregate from which any one or more units may be removed
without any effect either on the ones remaining or on the ones
removed” (ibid., p.25/42).
Where a collection is an “and-summation,” the properties of the whole are
merely summative, and can be understood in terms of: the intrinsic prop-
erties of the first item, and the intrinsic properties of the second item, and
the intrinsic properties of the third... and so on. For example, the weight of
a collection is equal to the weight of all the parts taken together. If all the
collection’s parts and properties work like this, it is a mere and-summation.
Gestalten, in contrast, exhibit interdependence: a kind of conditioning or
determination of parts’ properties occurs in virtue of their role in the whole.
Ko¨hler’s flagship examples of physical Gestalten concern electrostatic charges
in circuits – cases chosen for their presumed applicability to neural systems.
A simple case concerns a charged conductor. When charge is applied to an
insulated conductor, the charge (i) distributes itself over the outer surface of
the conductor, and (ii) attains equilibrium. The specific distributions which
count as equilibria are determined by physical properties of the conductor.
In a charged conductor which is, as a whole, at equilibrium, “it is impossible
to decrease, increase, or displace any part of this charge alone; for with any
such change there occurs a reaction throughout the entire natural structure”
(Ko¨hler, 1920, p.28/56). “In a word the structures of static charges upon
conductors of given shape are physical Gestalten” (Ko¨hler, 1920, p.28/68).
HI applies, because the charge at any point p on a conductor c is only
individuated (it only has the determinate properties it has) because the whole
7Citations to Ko¨hler usually provide (i) pagination from the only existing partial trans-
lation, due to Ellis (1967), followed by (ii) pagination from the first German edition. Ellis
employs significant editorializing, and while it is usually apt, I occasionally amend his
translation. Occasionally I cite a passage which was not included in Ellis’ translation, and
there provide only the page-number from the original.
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conductor is at equilibrium.8 The determinate amount of charge at any point
p could be varied by applying more or less charge to the whole conductor
and allowing it to attain equilibrium again.
HE also applies. We can answer the question of why the charge at p is as it
is by saying the whole conductor has attained equilibrium, given the applied
charge. Explanation need not stop here, of course; we can proceed to explain
how the conductor attains equilibrium in terms of the physical properties
of the conductor, the movements of ions, etc. This does not diminish or
counteract the holistic explanation in terms of equilibria.
Ko¨hler thought this model applied wholesale to the brain. Neurons were
regarded as poorly-insulated conductors. When charged, a field of electro-
static forces would surround the neuron, forming a Gestalt. A number of such
fields in interaction (e.g., in a region of the brain) would form a yet-larger
whole-field: another, larger Gestalt. The whole brain would exhibit a field
composed of myriad lesser Gestalten.9
Ko¨hler suggested further that a naturalistic explanation of any experi-
ence (e.g., the perceptual-phenomenal experience of seeing an illusory figure)
would depend upon their being some region of the brain exhibiting a ma-
terial Gestalt of electrostatic forces whose structure was isomorphic to the
structure of the experience. The perceptual tendency towards good form,
captured by the Law of Pra¨gnanz, would be mirrored by the electrostatic
tendency towards equilibrium. This doctrine of isomorphism, in its sim-
plest form, claimed: “actual consciousness resembles in each case the real
structural properties of the corresponding psycho-physical processes” (Ko¨hler,
1920, p.38/193).
My argument does not require viewing this as a workable approach to
psycho-physical explanation. I am concerned, initially, with the idea of a
material Gestalt in its own right: it is a separate question whether this bit
of Gestalt theory can be put to work in a naturalistic Gestalt psychology
in the way Ko¨hler envisioned. Likewise, it is irrelevant to my argument
whether electrostatic phenomena should, in the final analysis, be counted
8Again, “individuation” is used in a metaphysical sense: see S2.1 above.
9I omit some historical details: initially Ko¨hler held a more chemically-based view of
neuronal function.
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as material Gestalten.10 I am concerned only with what material Gestalten
were supposed to be, as characterized by HI and HE. With this sketched, I
turn to the New Mechanists.
2.3. Mechanisms as Gestalten: HI
New Mechanistic accounts are heterogeneous, and there are many subtly
distinct conception of mechanisms on offer. However, they all emphasize
the organization of mechanisms as an important feature. While it has been
overlooked, New Mechanists’ claims about organization either flirt with or
explicitly commit to the view that mechanisms are material Gestalten which
satisfy the two conditions HI and HE. I approach HI in this sub-section, then
discuss HE in the next.
Machamer, Darden, and Craver offered one influential characterization of
a mechanism:
“Mechanisms are entities and activities organized such that they
are productive of regular changes from start or set-up to finish or
termination conditions” (2000, p.3).
When a mechanism operates, a phenomenon of interest is produced. The
aim of mechanistic explanation is to exhibit the “productive continuity” of
the organized mechanism, making intelligible how the entities and actitivies
which compose it jointly operate to produce the phenomenon.
Beyond this, Machamer, Darden, and Craver say little to characterize
mechanisms’ organization. The organization of entities and activities “deter-
mines the ways in which they produce the phenomenon,” and “entities must
often be appropriately located, structured, and oriented, and the activities
in which they engage must have a temporal order, rate, and duration” (ibid.,
p.3). If we dig deeper, we find them flirting with HI. The issue concerns the
individuation of mechanisms and their parts. They maintain:
“[On one hand:] Mechanisms are identified and individuated by
the activities and entities that constitute them, by their start and
finish conditions, and by their functional roles.
10Likewise, I do not claim that all material Gestalten are mechanisms. So it is not a
problem if Glennan (1996, p.54) is right that electromagnetic fields cannot be mechanisti-
cally explained, in his sense.
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[On the other hand, in the next breath:] Functions are the
roles played by entities and activities in a mechanism. To see
an activity as a function is to see it as a component in some
mechanism... Functions... should be understood in terms of the
activities by virtue of which entities contribute to the workings of
a mechanism” (Machamer et al., 2000, p.6, my emph.).
The first claim suggests that entities, activities, and their functions are in-
dividuated prior to entering into an organization to compose a mechanism.
The parts’ individuation does not depend upon the whole mechanism’s or-
ganization, rather the whole mechanism is itself individuated on the basis
of the entities composing it.11 The second claim, by contrast, suggests that
no entity or activity has a function unless it is already a component of a
mechanism which is organized to produce a phenomenon. This latter claim
runs close to an endorsement of HI: no entity or activity possesses a function
unless it is part of an organized whole which produces a phenomenon, for its
function just is its contribution to the workings of the whole, and it cannot
make such a contribution unless it is situated within that whole.
Other New Mechanists likewise flirt with HI. Consider Glennan:
“My analysis can be summarized by a definition...
(M) A mechanism underlying a behavior is a complex
system which produces that behavior by the interaction
of a number of parts according to direct causal laws.
Notice that (M) is a definition of a ‘mechanism underlying a be-
havior’ rather than a mechanism simpliciter. One cannot even
identify a mechanism without saying what it is that the mecha-
nism does. The boundaries of the system, the division of it into
parts, and the relevant modes of interaction between these parts
depend upon what behavior we seek to explain” (Glennan, 1996,
52).
Elsewhere Glennan reasserts that “mechanisms are not mechanisms sim-
pliciter, but mechanisms for behaviors” (2002, S344). This claim – some-
times called Glennan’s Law – has been widely endorsed by New Mechanists
11MDC might here use “individuate” in an epistemic sense – see S2.1 above. This will
not disturb my argument.
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(cf. Glennan 2017, p.23-24; Illari & Williamson 2012, esp. fn.2 and p.134).
If that is so, then plausibly – as Glennan seems to suggest in the tail-end of
the passage above – the parts must likewise be understood not as “parts”
simpliciter, but as as parts-of-a-whole-mechanism-for some behavior. This
flirts with HI: the properties and interactions of parts that are genuinely rele-
vant to the production of the behavior are features they exhibit only while in
the organization of the whole system they compose. Take “the same parts”
out of that organization, and they no longer interact and condition each
other’s properties. Whatever they might still do, they contribute nothing to
the production of the behavior: they are no longer parts-of-a-mechanism-for
that behavior.
This “quick route” to HI through Glennan’s Law might seem unconvinc-
ing. In early work, Glennan might seem to resist it:
“...to prevent (M) from being vacuous... the parts of a mechanism
must have a kind of robustness and reality apart form their place
within that mechanism. It should in principle be possible to
take the part out of the mechanism and consider its properties
in another context. Care must be taken so that parts are neither
merely properties of the system as a whole nor artifacts of the
descriptional vocabulary. I shall summarize these restrictions by
saying that parts must be objects” (Glennan, 1996, p.53).
Note, however, that this does not fully evade HI. To treat parts as “objects” in
this sense requires only that they have some continued existence, and exhibit
some stable properties, outside of the organization of a mechanism. This
is consistent with the possibility that the parts may have other properties
only within the organization of a mechanism, per HI. In what follows, I
argue that mecha- nism parts are claimed to have just such holistically-
individuated properties, and that these properties are central to the (ontic)
New Mechanists view.
The underlying issue here concerns the extent of “decomposability” which
is required of mechanisms, or the extent to which organization is permit-
ted to condition parts’ properties. Both Craver (2007, p.135) and Bechtel
& Richardson (1993, p.25) appeal to the work of Wimsatt (1986, 1997) to
characterize mechanisms’ organization. Wimsatt articulated four conditions
which characterize different varieties of aggregativity. A system is a mere
aggregate, it is completely decomposable, if it meets all four conditions:
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1. Intersubstitutabilty of parts: rearranging and swapping parts doesn’t
influence the properties of the whole.
2. Qualitative similarity: the properties of the whole remain qualitatively
similar (if quantitative, varying only in value) with addition or sub-
traction of parts.
3. Stability through decomposition and re-aggregation of parts: the prop-
erties of the whole remain invariant even if previously-independent
parts are fused, and even if previously-linked parts are decoupled.
4. Minimal interactions among parts: there are no cooperative or in-
hibitory interactions among parts which influence properties of the
whole.12
If a system is a mere aggregate, the specific organization of the parts con-
tributes nothing significant to the features of the whole system: the whole is
neatly decomposable into parts whose operations are self-determined. What
Wimsatt calls a “mere aggregate” is quite clearly co-extensive with what
the Gestaltists called an “and-summation.” Where mere aggregativity (and-
summation) is violated, we have a material Gestalt.13
According to New Mechanists, a prototypical mechanism is precisely not
a mere aggregate. Craver (2007, pp.135-136) argues that mechanisms possess
an “active organization” in virtue of which they violate all four conditions for
mere aggregativity: a mechanism is not just “literally the sum of its parts”
(Craver 2007, p.135; see also Glennan 2017, p.23). Bechtel & Richardson
(1993, pp.26-32) claim that pursuing mechanistic explanation begins with fal-
lible heuristics of decomposition and localization, which presume that some
degree of decomposability is possible, hence that the mechanism under in-
vestigation possesses some form of aggregativity. However, they endorse the
12Wimsatt’s (1986) original presentation was adapted by Bechtel & Richardson (1993,
p.25). Wimsatt’s (1997, p.S376) more concise presentation was adapted by Craver (2007,
p.135). My adaptation here draws inspiration from all these sources.
13I am pursuing a conceptual argument that mechanisms’ organization makes them
material Gestalten. There may also be a more direct historical connection. Wimsatt (1986,
p.289) acknowledges that his view of aggregativity was likely influenced by disagreements
with Ernest Nagel’s “Wholes, sums, and organic unities” (1952; rpt. in The Structure of
Science). Nagel’s piece explicitly opposes Ko¨hler’s conception of physical Gestalten. When
New Mechanists borrow Wimsatt’s anti-Nagelian view to clarify the nature of mechanisms’
organization, they implicitly borrow, second-hand, a Gestaltist view.
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view that (New) Mechanistic explanation does not require decomposition
and direct localization (ibid., cf. pp.227ff.), and can be pursued even where
a system is only “minimally decomposable” – i.e., where conditions 1-4 are
violated (ibid., p.26). Just to the extent that conditions 1-4 are violated
by mechanistic systems, HI applies to them: the failure of decomposability
arises precisely because some parts’ properties are individuated only when
they occur in the right kind of whole.
We can clarify in greater detail precisely how the Mechanist implicitly
endorses HI regarding such systems. Craver serves as a useful guiding exam-
ple. A mechanistic explanation of how a system (“S”) exhibits a behavior
(“y-ing”) proceeds by clarifying how it its parts (“Xs”) exhibit some lesser
behavior(s) (“f -ing”), and how the behaviors of the parts contribute to the
behavior of the whole. To provide any such explanation, we must reckon
with the active organization of the parts, and must deny that they form a
mere aggregate. The parts:
“...act and interact with one another in such a way that the y-ing
of S is more than just a sum of f -properties. In fact, the f -
properties of a working mechanism are not just properties; they
are the activities of and interactions among the entities in the
working mechanism. The different components act in cooperation
or competition, and they do so with some components and not
with others. It matters which Xs f with which others, and it
matters how they interact. This is why the parts of mechanisms
often cannot be reorganized randomly... added or subtracted at
will... or taken apart and put back together again... without
disturbing their corporate ability to y”(Craver, 2007, p.136, my
emph.).
Notice: f -properties or parts’ activities are fully-individuated as such (they
are what they are) only when the whole mechanism is working to produce its
behavior and the parts are interacting in the organization which composes the
mechanism. HI applies. Take “the same parts” out of that organization, or
impede the working of the mechanism, and – whatever you might learn about
the parts – you will not observe the full set of f -properties they exhibit in the
mechanism, since these f -properties arise only in the context of the whole,
active organization. Glennan also endorses this in recent work: “For some
entity that is part of a mechanism to actually contribute to the production
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of the phenomenon for which the mechanism is responsible, it must produce
changes in other parts of the mechanism; there is no production without
interaction” (2017, 21-22). The interactions of the parts is what renders
mechanisms organized wholes rather than mere aggregates. This is why parts
cannot simply be studied in isolation, but must be recomposed to provide
a complete explanation of how they produce the phenomenon of interest
(Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2009, 2013).
Commitment to HI is in fact encoded again in leading accounts of the
“components” or “working parts” of a mechanism. Craver’s account will
be a recurring topic of discussion in S3 below, and I shall say more about it
there. For now, not everything within a mechanism counts as a working com-
ponent relevant to the mechanism’s operation. Following Salmon14 Craver
calls this the issue of “constitutive explanatory relevance:” the issue of which
of the items spatially contained within a mechanism genuinely contribute to
its organized operations, in virtue of which the explanandum phenomenon
occurs. Craver offers what he calls the mutual manipulability criterion of
constitutive relevance, and with it, a practical strategy for identifying those
component parts which contribute to a mechanism’s operation:
“...a part is a [working] component in a mechanism if one can
change the behavior of the mechanism as a whole by interven-
ing to change the component and one can change the behavior
of the component by intervening to change the behavior of the
mechanism as a whole” (2007, p.141).
The practical orientation here clearly hides ontological commitment to the
claim that working components and whole mechanism are co-individuated:
14Craver (2007, p.8, fn.9; p.140, fn.19) insists that he follows Salmon’s (1984a, p.297)
usage, and does not intend to invoke any other metaphysical conception of constitution.
Salmon clarifies his view as follows: “A constitutive explanation is thoroughly causal, but
it does not explain particular facts or general regularities in terms of causal antecedents.
The explanation shows, instead, that the fact-to-be-explained is constituted by underlying
causal mechanisms. Many cases of physical reduction qualify as constitutive explanations.
When, for example, we explain optical phenomena in term’s of Maxwell’s electromagnetic
theory, the explanation is constitutive. Light waves are the electromagnetic waves (in a
particular part of the spectrum) treated by Maxwell’s theory” (Salmon, 1984b, p.270).
Here a metaphysical claim of constitution is treated as a claim of identity (the whole
mechanism is the organization of the working parts). This is stronger than the claim of
co-individuation I focus on in this paper.
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the component, qua component, is thus-and-so only when the whole mecha-
nism is thus-and-so, and vice versa. That is why an intervention to change
one changes the other. Glennan supports these same points in more recent
work:
[A]ll mechanisms are mechanisms for some phenomenon... If we
characterize a mechanism as a thing S (entity or system) that
is y-ing, what counts as part of the mechanism’s phenomenon
(the y-ing) depends upon what is actually contributing to the
production of the phenomenon. Take for instance a car. A car
is a system with many mechanisms, but pre-eminently a car is
a system for driving on roads. While the car has many parts,
not all parts contribute to its driving. The wheels matter but
the rear-view mirror does not. Those parts of the car that are
implicated in the mechanism are its working parts... A similar
point may be made about the activities involved... The engine,
for instance, is a working part of the car’s mechanism for turning
the wheels, but produces heat as it rotates the crankshaft. The
rotation, but not the heat, is a working activity in the mechanism
(2017, pp.23-24).
And a similar point, we can add, should be made about the interactions
between parts. The working interactions between parts are what constitute
the mechanism’s “active organization,” in virtue of which they parts jointly
contribute to the production of the explanandum phenomenon. Other inter-
actions are irrelevant (e.g., light might be reflected from the rear-view mirror
onto the steering wheel.)
In sum, the Mechanist aims to explain the operation of a whole mechanism
by appeal to the working components, their working activities, and their
working interactions. But those components, activities, and interactions are
co-individuated with the whole: they are what they are only when the whole
is what it is. Thus, HI applies to mechanisms. And it applies non-trivially:
HI applies to precisely those features of mechanisms’ working parts which
arise through the distinctive organization of the mechanism. To the extent
that a system is a mechanism, HI must, to some degree, apply.
2.4. Mechanisms as Gestalten: HE
Now, is the Mechanist likewise committed to HE? The sorts of expla-
nations which New Mechanists have championed are roughly the inverse of
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HE. Mechanistic explanation is construed as a decompositional or reductive
strategy which aims to show how the parts of the mechanism work together
to produce a phenomenon (cf. Bechtel & Richardson 1993, p.17; Machamer
et al. 2000, p.21; Bechtel & Abrahamsen 2005, p.425 Craver 2007, p.133;
Glennan 2017, p.223). In contrast, HE applied to mechanisms would be the
claim that some properties of the parts are only explicable with reference
to the whole mechanism. Clearly, for the purposes of mainstream Mechanis-
tic explanation, HE is irrelevant.15 Yet, for other explanatory purposes, HE
appears quite suitable. I offer an illustration.
A common example in the New Mechanist literature is the mechanism
of action potential generation in a neuron. We offer a mainstream Mecha-
nistic explanation of how an action potential is generated by adverting to
activities of the components – e.g., the joint operations of voltage-gated Na+
and K+ channels. But suppose we ask (after an action potential occurs in
an intact neuron): why was the Na+ channel open? Ceteris paribus, a per-
fectly respectable answer seems to be an application of HE: the Na+ channel
was open because the whole neuron was firing an action potential. This
holistic explanation is available precisely because the opening of the Na+
channel is a working activity of a working component of the mechanism-for
the action potential and is of constitutive relevance for the production of
the action potential, such that (ceteris paribus) if the Na+ channel opens,
the neuron fires an action potential, and vice versa. Where the events occur
fully-individuated as the phenomenon of interest and the working activity
that contributes to it, the two are co-individuated and co-constitutive.
This is not a causal explanation, for all the usual reasons that consti-
tution is not causation (cf. Craver 2007, pp.153-154). It is what Glennan
would call a non-causal explanation, a “why-but-not-what-or-how explana-
tion” (2017, p.223-224). One who prefers causal explanations will likely find
this application of HE deeply unsatisfying. Of course, explanation need not
stop here, and the New Mechanist is free to pursue their preferred style of
explanation. I do not see that this diminishes holistic explanations of the
15This is as good as any a place to indicate one more connection between NewMechanism
and Gestaltism. In their broadly “reductive” approach, New Mechanists resist the idea
that classical “laws” can be cited to derive the whole mechanism’s behavior from the
behavior of the parts. They thus regard mechanisms as exhibiting what were called, in
analyses of Gestaltism, “emergent wholistic properties” (Rescher, 1953, p.327), or “D-G-T
underivable attributes”(Rescher & Oppenheim, 1955, p.93).
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sort I’ve just described.
Still, let me offer two arguments to dispel the air of triviality that might
surround HE.16 While initial statements of New Mechanism suggested on-
tological commitment to mechanistic explanations as things in the world,
there has more recently been a split over whether mechanistic explanation
should be fundamentally regarded as epistemic or ontic. The epistemic view
holds (roughly) that, most fundamentally, explanation is a matter of mak-
ing some phenomenon predictable, intelligible, or understandable. The ontic
view holds that, most fundamentally, explanations are things in the world
that cause, constitute, or are otherwise naturally responsible for the occur-
rence of some phenomenon. Both views should recognize that HE, applied
to mechanisms, can offer a legitimate explanation.
Start with the epistemic view. It’s a contingent matter of fact that mecha-
nistic explanations tend to be pursued in cases where scientists have identified
a phenomenon, made a provisional attempt to circumscribe the mechanism-
for that phenomenon, and are now laboring to identify its working parts,
activities, and interactions. Under these conditions, we are familiar enough
with the phenomenon to target it as our explanandum, and we cast our hy-
potheses about parts with reference to it. Under these conditions, HE will
appear unsatisfying: we already know (somewhat) what the whole mech-
anism is doing (but not how it does it), so attempting to explain why a
part does what it does by invoking the whole’s behavior may seem to get
us nowhere. However, we could conceivably discover that some system is a
working part of a newly-discovered, larger mechanism. That is: we previ-
ously understood some of the features and activities of the part, but come to
understand it as a working part in a previously unidentified mechanism-for
a phenomenon. In that case, there would be real novelty involved in coming
to understand that the part does what it does when the whole does what it
does. We would have increased understanding of the part if we could under-
stand its behavior in terms of the behavior of the whole. “Going up a level”
can be, in its own way, explanatory (Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2005, p.426). In
the usual course of events, we begin our attempts at mechanistic explanations
with the preconception that the significant parts will be working parts of the
whole. We might then overlook the epistemic explanatory value of HE, but
16For clear (footstamping) accusations of triviality against this sort of explanation (sim-
ply because it is not decompositional) see e.g. Allport 1924 & Hamlyn 1951.
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it is still there.
Consider next the ontic view. I’ve argued that (early and ontic) New
Mechanists are committed to the claim that a whole mechanism-for a phe-
nomenon is co-individuated (in a metaphysical sense) with the working parts,
activities, and interactions which compose it. The whole mechanism’s y-ing
is co-constitutive with the working parts’ joint f -ing. The working parts
only exhibit the full list of f -activities when they work together to produce
the phenomenon of interest, and when they do so, the phenomenon is pro-
duced. (Likewise: an electrical field attaining equilibrium is co-constituted
with a certain charge being attained at each point in the field.) Now the
ontic theorist maintains that an ontic explanation is what causes, consti-
tutes, or is otherwise responsible for the production of some phenomenon. If
the phenomenon of interest is some behavior of the whole mechanism, then
we can pursue a standard mechanistic explanation in terms of the working
parts which constitute it. If the phenomenon of interest is some behavior
of a working part, however, and if that part’s exhibiting that behavior is co-
constitutive with the whole exhibiting its behavior, then the behavior of the
whole is equally well an ontic explanation of the behavior of the part. Be-
cause “constitutive relevance is symmetrical in a way that etiological (that
is, causal) relevance is not,” the whole’s behavior constitutes, or is otherwise
(i.e., non-causally) responsible for – it is an ontic explanation of – the behav-
ior of the part (Craver, 2007, 153). This is not the sort of ontic explanation
that ontic Mechanists have given pride of place, but it is nonetheless, by their
own lights, an ontic explanation.17
Both camps, then, should recognize HE as a legitimate form of explana-
tion, whether or not it is especially central to Mechanists’ favored explana-
17HI, the ontic theorist would urge, is why HE holds, such that we can answer a why-
question about the part by adverting to the whole. This was essentially Ko¨hler’s view.
Uncovering the New Mechanists’ commitment to HE thus addresses an issue which Fagan
(2012, p.459; 2015) seemed to raise as an objection. If constitution is symmetrical, Fagan
thinks it cannot account for the “bottom-up” or decompositional direction of mechanis-
tic explanation: why shouldn’t we also explain parts’ behaviors by appeal to the whole
mechanism’s? Answer: we could, and we should not seek to rule out in advance that we
could. We should simply restrict the notion of (mainstream) “mechanistc” explanation
to the decompositional direction: mechanistic explanations in this sense are not holistic,
though wherever they are available, a holistic explanation is as well.
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tions.18 Note: I have not claimed that the mechanists are correct in implicitly
endorsing HI and HE. I have only sought to show that they are committed
to the claims, and thus to the claim that mechanisms – if they are real – are
material Gestalten.
3. Recent Attempts to Understand Constitutive Organization
Mechanisms’ organization is clearly central to their explanatory value. De-
spite this, until recently Mechanists said little to clarify mechanisms’ organi-
zation. Indeed, one might object that the applicability of the term “material
Gestalten” to mechanisms simply trades on an under-specified conception of
their organization. In this section I pursue two aims simultaneously. First,
I emphasize that the burden of providing a philosophical analysis of the na-
ture of mechanisms’ organization is widely recognized to rest squarely on
the Mechanists’ shoulders: if the identity of mechanisms and Gestalten is
cause for alarm, the complaint should be lodged with the Mechanists, not
with me. Second, I examine a recent in-house debate amongst Mechanists,
showing that there is little consensus regarding how Mechanists’ might carry
this burden. In S4 hereafter, I show that this in-house debate was anticipated
decades ago by Merleau-Ponty in his claims against the Gestaltists, and draw
upon his work to offer a diagnosis of the debate.
3.1. Craver’s Mutual Manipulability Criterion
One influential attempt to clarify mechanisms’ organization was Craver’s
“mutual manipulability” criterion, introduced in S2.3 above. As I read him,
Craver sought to clarify a sufficient criterion for concluding that some part
of a mechanism is a working component, and is of constitutive relevance for
the production of the phenomenon of interest. The account was explicitly
offered as a novel adaptation of Woodward’s (2002, 2003) manipulationist
account of causal relevance, modified to address constitutive relevance.
Woodward’s account, roughly, is that we can say an item X is causally
relevant to an item Y in conditions C if there is an ideal intervention on X
in C (i.e., an intervention exclusively on X which neither affects any causal
intermediaries between X and Y, nor directly effects Y) which would change
the value of Y (compare Craver 2007, pp.94-95). Or, still more roughly: X is
18Doing so would increase mechanisms’ explanatory import, beyond decompositional
how explanations.
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causally relevant to Y if wiggling X (alone) would wiggle Y. Craver utilizes
this account to clarify the norms of causal explanation he discerns in neuro-
scientific practice, particularly in the experimental strategies neuroscientists
undertake to determine the causal relevance of entities in a mechanism (ibid.,
pp. 98-104).
Some distinctive experiments that neuroscientists perform are what Craver
calls interlevel experiments, including “bottom-up” and “top-down” exper-
iments (see 2007, p.146ff. for details). Scientists use these experiments to
determine whether a part of a mechanism is a working part which is of con-
stitutive relevance to the production of a whole mechanism’s explanandum
phenomenon (ibid., p.144.). The inspiration for Craver’s mutual manipula-
bility account comes from considering the practicalities of experimentation:
“the close analogy between causal experiments [i.e., those performed to un-
cover causal relations] and interlevel experiments suggests that the manip-
ulability account of etiological [or causal] relevance might provide a model
for thinking about constitutive mechanistic relevance” (ibid., p.152). Mutual
manipulability, as we saw it in S2.3 above, relies on a bidirectional or sym-
metrical version of Woodward’s conception of manipulability. In short, if X
is a part of Y, and if wiggling X (alone) wiggles Y, and if wiggling Y (alone)
wiggles X, then Craver suggests we have sufficient reason to conclude that
they are of constitutive relevance to each other. And conversely: where we
can demonstrate a lack of mutual manipulability, we have sufficient reason
to conclude there is a lack of constiutive relevance (ibid., p.159). This, he
suggests, is how neuroscientists actually do determine whether a putative
part of a mechanism is a working part of it.
The mutual manipulability criterion was offered as a “starting point” for
understanding mechanisms’ consitutitive organization (Craver, 2007, 160).
It has not proven to be a fixed starting point, and its merits are a subject of
continued debate.
3.2. Organization, Post-Craver
In this sub-section I review the ongoing debate regarding how to under-
stand mechanism’s constitutive organization. I discuss this debate in some
detail for two reasons. First my aim in S4 below is to draw upon the work
of Merleau-Ponty to offer a diagnosis of the debate, and it is crucial to my
argument that the diagnosis does not rely on a simplified or straw-manned
variant of the debate, but rather captures all its significant features. Second,
it is likewise crucial to my argument and diagnosis that a sober view of the
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debate reveals that ontic Mechanists – though they largely agree that con-
stitutive relevance should not be understood causally – have reached little
consensus regarding what their ontological commitment to organized mech-
anisms amounts to, or where that commitment comes from. This can only
be shown with a detailed overview of the debate. Readers familiar with the
debate might skip to S3.3 for an over-all summary, and selectively revisit this
subsection as they see fit.
The continued debate about how to understand parts’ constitutive rele-
vance to mechanisms’ organization can largely be understood as arising from
a perceived tension between three claims,19 all of which have been traced to
Craver’s work:
C1. Woodward’s account of ideal interventions (as stated in earlier work
and as sketched in S3.1 above) offers a suitable ontological analysis of
the relation of causal relevance.20
C2. Mutual manipulability (as stated by Craver and as sketched in S3.1
above) offers an ontological analysis of the relation of constitutive rel-
evance, through an application of Woodward’s account of causal rele-
vance.
C3. The constitutive relations between levels of a mechanism (e.g., working
part and whole) are not causal (e.g., because they are synchronic).
If C1 and C2 are true, then constitution is a (bidirectional) causal relation,
and C3 is false. Yet upholding C3 seemed to be the intended motivation
for the mutual manipulability criterion: what Craver sought was a model
for thinking about constitutive relevance relations as distinct from causal
relations. So if C1 and C3 impose constraints on an ontological analysis of
constitutive relevance, then mutual manipulability seems not to be a coherent
ontological analysis of constitutive relevance.
A major choice-point in the debate concerns C2. Some authors evade the
tension by rejecting C2 as false. One way to do so is to view mutual ma-
nipulability as only an epistemic criterion for when it is apt to believe that
a part is a working part. On this view, Craver’s appropriation of the formal
19My exegesis in this subsection owes much to Romero (2015) and Krickel (2018).
20It should be noted that Woodward does not explicitly endorse this view: cf. Woodward
2003, p.7. Still, this is a popular reading, invoked by a number of participants in the debate.
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apparatus of Woodward’s interventionism to express mutual manipulability
does not provide an ontological analysis of what mechanistic constitution is
(cf. Couch 2011, pp.381-382; Fagan 2012, p.459; Glennan 2017, p.44).21 In
that case, it is an open problem to go beyond mutual manipulability, by offer-
ing a genuine ontological analysis of constitutive relevance. Couch proposes
appropriating a distinct analysis of causation to understand constitution. He
draws upon Mackie’s (1974) well-known analysis of a cause as an insufficient
but nonredundant part of an unnecessary but sufficient (INUS) condition.
On Couch’s analysis, a working part of a mechanism is “an insufficient but
nonredundant part of an unnecessary but sufficient mechanism” for a phe-
nomenon (2011, p.384). Couch’s account is often-cited, but rarely discussed.
Glennan cryptically suggests that it offers only an epistemic criterion (2017,
p.44, fn.22). (As I discuss further below, it is difficult to locate an alterna-
tive ontological analysis in Glennan’s work.) Krickel dispenses with Couch
by branding his a “regularity account” of constitutive relevance – 2018, fn.3,
a characterization that seems to have started with Harbecke (2015) – and
sets it aside to pursue an interventionist account.
I suggest that Couch’s account may have been poorly understood pre-
cisely because it flirts with HI and HE. Couch insists that his is a truly on-
tological account, which “provides an explanation of what the [constitutive]
relevance relation is” (Couch, 2011, p.387). The relation he has described is
“being an insufficient but nonredundant part of an unnecessary but sufficient
mechanism.” One could have difficulty seeing that this helps us understand
constitutive relevance. A sufficient mechanism is one that is sufficient to pro-
duce the phenomenon of interest. It does this because its relevant parts work
together to jointly produce the phenomenon. So much is largely a matter of
definition. Now comes the key question: what is the nature of those parts
which are the relevant parts? Couch’s answer: they’re the ones that, when
21As a matter of interpreting Craver, I would reject C2 along these lines, and find
little support for it in his work. Baumgartner & Gebharter suggest Craver offers mutual
manipulability as a “necessary and sufficient condition” for the occurrence of relations
of constitutive relevance, and claim that unspecified “textual evidence [in Craver] clearly
contradicts” the view that he offers only an epistemic criterion (2015, p.738, fn.4). While
Craver’s offering a “merely” epistemic criterion is somewhat discordant with the bulk of
his text, this seems clearly to be where he winds up: cf. Craver 2007, bottom of p.159. It
is in any case more charitable to suppose this is his view, if the alternative is to accuse
him of conflating constitution and causation precisely where he aims to distinguish them.
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non-redundantly working together, compose a mechanism which is sufficient
to produce the phenomenon (though each of them individually is insufficient).
We might ask again: but what is the nature of the parts which makes them
fit for this role? Couch’s account seems to offer no general answer to this
question. It’s nothing about the parts themselves, considered in isolation,
which makes them constitutively relevant. Rather it is their participation (of
the right sort) in a whole (of the right sort).
Other authors do not deny C2 – they hold that Craver’s mutual ma-
nipulability criterion is an ontological analysis of mechanistic constitution
(Leuridan 2011, S5; Fagan 2012, pp.458-459; Baumgartner & Gebharter 2015;
Romero 2015, S2.3; Gallagher 2018, p.5). The question then is whether it is
suitable as it stands. Leuridan is alone in suggesting that we abandon C3: so-
called “constitutive” relations (as per C2) turn out to be bidirectional causal
relations (as per C1) (Leuridan, 2011, p.424). On this view, the concept of
causal relevance turns out to be ambiguous between “intralevel etiological
relevance (or causal relevance sensu strictu) and interlevel relevance” (ibid.,
p.424). Leuridan is aware that this does not fully resolve the issue: “There is
a difference between interlevel relations [i.e., part-whole relations, in general]
and bidirectional etiological relations... But my proposal makes clear that
the difference in question is not as strict as Craver and Bechtel claim it to
be and that as yet we lack the means to spell it out” (ibid., p.424).
Most authors seek to uphold C3: they regard the distinction between
causal relevance and constitutive relevance to be non-negotiable. One family
of views along these lines invoke the idea of so-called “fat-handed” interven-
tions. Romero (2015) suggested that we should not understand interlevel
experiments as involving anything like Woodward’s ideal interventions, in
which only a part is manipulated and the result is a change in the whole,
or only the whole is manipulated and the result is a change in the part.
Rather, both are“fat-handed” (somewhat un-selective) manipulations: a ma-
nipulation of a working part simultaneously manipulates the whole, and a
manipulation of the whole simultaneously manipulates at least one working
part. This is to be expected if (as I have argued is true for New Mecha-
nists) the two are regarded as co-constitutive. Romero adopts a stronger
ontological claim of identity here, saying “a mechanism’s activity [i.e., the
explanandum phenomenon] and its components arranged and working in the
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right way are the same physical event” (2015, 3746).22 Ultimately, Romero
does not offer a worked out ontological interpretation of constitutive rele-
vance (cf. 2015, p.3749, p.3750). Since the fat-handed interventions involved
in mutual manipulability are not ideal interventions, Romero can afford to
be agnostic regarding C1 (ibid., p.3749). Since fat-handed interventions in
interlevel experiments produce simultaneous changes in part and whole, the
relation between part and whole should not be considered a causal relation
(ibid., 3747). In this way C3 is upheld.
Baumgartner & Gebharter (2015) pursue a similar strategy of appealing
to fat-handed interventions, but also incorporate recent amendments that
Woodward (2015) has made to his interventionist account. They can thus be
read as rejecting C1, since (following Woodward himself) they adopt a revised
conception of ideal interventions. They endorse C2, but reject mutual ma-
nipulability as an acceptable ontological account. They seek to uphold C3.
Notably, however, they do not provide an alternative ontological analysis
of constitution: their aim is rather to clarify how fat-handed interventions,
understood in the right way, provide “abductive evidence for constitutive
dependences” (ibid., p.753). Theirs is a novel epistemic criterion, pursued
because they think that mutual manipulability is incoherent – both as an
epistemic and as an ontological criterion (ibid., S3). In a follow-up paper,
Baumgartner & Casini (2017) have advanced an ontological account of con-
stitutive relevance. In short, constitutive relevance is that relation between
parts and whole in virtue of which the two cannot be causally decoupled,
such that fat-handedness is a necessary consequence: the impossibility of mu-
tual manipulability through ideal interventions becomes the defining mark
of constitutive relevance, and thus fat-handedness can serve as an epistemic
standard for inferring constitutive relevance.
Fat-handedness is sometimes viewed as descriptively inadequate to char-
acterize scientists’ interlevel experiments. Thus another response to the ten-
sion between C1-C3 is to try to maintain the spirit of all three claims, with
suitable tweaks. This is the strategy pursued by Krickel (2018). Krickel
takes C3 to be non-negotiable. She follows Baumgartner & Gebhartner in
accommodating Woodward’s recent revisions, altering the conception of ideal
intervention, and thus rejecting the letter of C1. In her view, the real so-
lution depends on clarifying the relata that stand in relations of causal and
22Compare Salmon’s remarks in fn.14 above.
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constitutive relevance. In the sketches above, we supposed that a relation of
consitutive relevance held between (a) some working part(s) and (b) a whole
mechanism producing an explanandum phenomenon. Krickel’s account relies
on a more fine-grained view of the phenomenon as composed of a number
of temporal parts, each of which occurs as phases of the whole mechanism’s
prolonged activity of exhibiting the phenomenon. If we get fine-grained in
this way, the interventionist can say that there is a single entity (the mecha-
nism, constituted as it is) whose spatial and temporal moments are mutually
manipulable: (i) some working part(s), working at t1, causally contributes
to the production of a temporal part of the explanandum phenomenon at t2,
such that ideally intervening on the former at t1 would causally influence the
latter at t2, and (ii) this same temporal part of the phenomenon causally
contributes to changes in the same working part(s) at t3, such that ideally
intervening on the former at t2 would causally influence the latter at t3.
This mutual manipulability does not, however, render constitution relations
causal: the causal relations all hold between fine-grained spatio-temporal
moments of one entity (the organized mechanism). So the causal relations
which underlie mutual manipulability – though they are interlevel causal re-
lations – are all diachronic, and are distinct from the synchronic constitution
relations between part and whole. Yet if we emphasize the “temporal hetero-
geneity” of the phenomenon, we can always (ideally) directly manipulate one
and not the other, and thus preserve the possibility of ideal interventions,
avoiding limitation to fat-handed interventions.23 The ontological analysis
of constitutive relevance is then that a phenomenon and working-part are of
constitutive relevance to each other iff the foregoing causal relations of mutual
manipulability hold between their fine-grained spatiotemporal moments.24
There is one final view worth noting, though it is difficult to cast in terms
of C1-C3. Fagan (2012, 2015) has proposed to understand the organization
of mechanisms on analogy with Bratman’s (1992) analysis of joint or socially-
23It is not clear to me how Krickel’s account avoids the claim that interventions on
working parts or the phenomenon are – considered at a moment – fat-handed: they must
be so, if the two are co-constitutive. Her account does not analyze mutual manipulability
or constitutive relevance as fat-handed interventions, but I do not see how one could
intervene to alter some working part’s working, at t1, without simultaneously altering the
temporal part of the phenomenon occurring at t1 (and vice versa) on her account.
24Gallagher (2018) cites Krickel’s work as inspiration for an enactivist account of “causal
constitution” in his enactivist theory of cognition.
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shared intentional action. To borrow her illustration: you and I might each
have an individual intention to walk, and might wind up walking in the same
direction; or alternatively, we might have a shared intention, and might walk
together in genuinely social action. “By analogy with the social action case,
joint activities in biological contexts can be analyzed as follows:
(J) Components x1 and x2 jointly f if and only if:
(i) x1 has properties that mesh with those of x2 and vice versa,
(ii) x1 and x2 form a complex x1x2 in virtue of their meshing properties,
(iii) complex x1x2 f ’s and
(iv) uncomplexed x1 and x2 do not f ” (Fagan, 2015, p.75).
The notion of “meshing” is meant to capture those features of working com-
ponents which enable them to work together. In the social case, this would
crucially include shared intentions. In purely biological contexts, “meshing”
is a placeholder for some non-intentional something which can analogously
unite the activities of biological entities into a joint activity of f -ing – “the no-
tion of meshing properties here needs further clarification, obviously” (ibid.,
p.74). Applying (J) to mechanisms, we claim that a number of meshing parts
together constitute the mechanism itself, and their joint activity constitutes
the mechanism’s exhibiting the explanandum phenomenon. We can explain
the explanandum phenomenon on the basis of these constitution relations.
The explanation is intended to be “bottom-up” or decompositional: “the
meshing properties required for interaction are the basis of the entire expla-
nation” (ibid., p.74 – contrast the discussion of Couch above, and see also
fn.17 above). Glennan’s most recent account is similar in spirit. Glennan
suggests that working parts have “affinities... capacities to ‘seek out’ and en-
gage in interactions with other parts,” and that “All mechanistic organization
depends to some degree upon the existence of affinities – as parts must have
capacities to interact with other parts” (2017, p.121). Glennan offers this as
a kind of extension of the concept of affinities between chemical reactants,
yet does not offer a very clear ontological analysis of affinities in general.
Much of the work done by Glennan’s concept of affinities is intuitive, relying
on an analogy with social affinities between persons – note the scare-quoted
use of intentional or anthropomorphic language to describe parts’ affinities.
Fagan’s formal apparatus looks like a step beyond an intuitive grasp on
social action, but does not get us very far. Fagan sees part of the value of
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(J) as “making the organization of interacting components central to mech-
anisms,” but – see S2.3 above – this does not seem to me to be a novel
development (2015, p.75).25 (J), applied to mechanisms, appears to be an
alternative description of the basic features of mechanistic organization: the
constitutively relevant working parts of a mechanism are held to be the ones
that work together (because they “mesh”) to constitute the mechanism’s
production of the explanandum phenomenon. This is “active organization”
as described in S2.3 above. The debate I’ve been reviewing has concerned
whether and how we can provide an ontological analysis of constitutive rele-
vance. In Fagan’s account, we swap the problem of constitutive relevance for
the problem of analyzing “meshing,” yet we are given no ontological analysis
of it. The analogy to social intentional action seems especially inapt as a
starting point: what non-intentional feature of biological parts could be rel-
evantly analogous to shared intentions? The envisioned ontological analysis
would seem to be capable of succeeding only where it enforces a breakdown
of the analogy which is offered to promote it.26
3.3. The Present Debate, in Sum
Let’s take stock. The ongoing debate about constitutive relevance is
largely a series of rival attempts to understand constitution non-causally.
The debate was initiated by a reading of Craver (2007) as ontologically ana-
lyzing constitutive relevance as mutual manipulability – i.e., as bidirectional
causation, in terms of Woodward’s interventionism. Few suggest that con-
stitutive relevance should be understood causally in this way, and those that
do admit that this is only a starting point in an ontological analysis of con-
stitutive relevance (Leuridan, 2011). Most pursue a non-causal analysis of
constitutive relevance – though there is a tendency toward renewed attempts
to adapt pre-existing analyses of causation (Couch, 2011, Harbecke, 2015),
and also a tendency toward metaphors which do not seem to advance our
25I confess I find much of Fagan’s motivation difficult to discern, and suspect we must
have very different readings of, e.g., Craver. Fagan (2012, 2015) offers extended arguments,
purportedly against Craver (2007), for distinguishing causal relations (and explanations)
from constitutive relations (and explanations) – which I think Craver had intended to do
from the outset.
26More recently, Fagan sketches the relations of meshing which make mechanisms’ parts
“fit together” as “involv[ing] causal, spatiotemporal, and mutual binding relations” (2016,
p.1096). Compare the scanty remarks on mechanism’s organization offered by MDC,
discussed at the start of S2.3 above.
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understanding of the ontology of constitutive relevance (Fagan, 2015, Glen-
nan, 2017). Some analyses abandon the possibility of ideal interventions on
parts and wholes (and thus mutual manipulability), allowing only fat-handed
interventions on working parts and wholes (Romero, 2015). This route risks
abandoning an ontological analysis of constitutive relevance, offering a merely
epistemic criterion (Baumgartner & Gebharter, 2015), unless we turn the ta-
bles and analyze constitutive relevance as what necessitates fat-handedness
(Baumgartner & Casini, 2017). If we get very fine-grained in our analysis,
we might uphold mutual manipulability while also distinguishing causal re-
lations from constitutive relations (Krickel, 2018). Some accounts seem to
enforce a decompositional approach, in which properties of the parts, consid-
ered in isolation, are ultimately what explain constitutive relevance (Fagan,
2015, Glennan, 2017), whereas others may take a more holistic approach
(Couch, 2011).
In short, as Kaiser & Krickel have summarized it recently: “the notion
of mechanistic constitution has gained increasing attention... But so far no
approach has been developed that has found common acceptance” (2016,
p.746, fn.3). According to the ontic Mechanists, Mechanistic explanation
commits us ontologically to something – they do not agree what – called
“constitutive relevance,” and leading accounts of Mechanistic explanation
must be supplemented – they do not agree how – to provide some account of
constitutive relevance, and of the ontology of organized mechanisms.
4. A Merleau-Pontian Diagnosis and Null Hypothesis
In this section my aim is to show that Merleau-Ponty’s claims about
Gestalten anticipate and diagnose much of the debate I’ve just reviewed.
I first (S4.1) introduce the reader to Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s engagement
with the Gestaltists, particularly in La Structure du comportement (“SC”)
(1963/1943).27 In Merleau-Ponty’s view, Gestalten are not mind-independent
entities, and they possess their unique organization only as mind-dependent
objects of (perceptual) consciousness. As a result, their organization cannot
be adequately analyzed in a causal-objective framework. I underscore that
Merleau-Ponty’s own arguments against the Gestaltists rely on premises that
will likely not win wide acceptance. However, I next (S4.2) show how his ar-
27For further elaboration of the reading of SC I invoke here, see Sheredos (2017).
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guments might plausibly be extended, specifically to resist ontological com-
mitment to the material Gestalten which the New Mechanists have sough to
characterize. In short, we could adopt a strong epistemic (as opposed to on-
tic) conception of mechanisms, treating them as idealized theoretical entities,
as Bechtel (2015) has urged. Finally (S4.3) I argue that this view would offer
a diagnosis of the Mechanists’ failure to reach consensus on an objective,
ontological analysis of constitutive relevance: there is no such analysis to be
had. I thus suggest that a Merleau-Pontian conception of Gestalten offers
us a null hypothesis: until an adequate, objective analysis of mechanism’s
organization is provided (from an ontic standpoint) we may more modestly
view their organization as mind-dependent (epistemic).
4.1. Merleau-Ponty on Gestalt Theory
In Merleau-Ponty’s view, it is phenomena of order which centrally in-
spired the Gestaltists to invoke the category of “form” or “structure” or
“Gestalt.” In doing so, the Gestaltists opposed a classical conception of
scientific realism, which viewed the world as ultimately composed of physi-
calistic, ontic “atoms,” which stand in unidirectional causal relations. Each
atom’s capabilities depend ultimately on its intrinsic properties. In the clas-
sical view, order does not exist, and there are no wholes which possess any
distinctive features or capabilities that are not reducible to those of juxta-
posed atoms. The classical view is thus incapable of recognizing – let alone
properly explaining – orderly phenomena. A central example in Merleau-
Ponty’s discussion concerns the orderly (active and adaptive) character of
intelligent behavior. The classical view would require us to treat all behav-
ior as arising through reflex-elicitations, “the action of a defined physical or
chemical agent on a locally defined receptor which evokes a defined response
by means of a defined pathway” (SC , pp.8-9/6-7).28
With regard to behavior, the basic issue is that the classical view, as
sketched above, can provide no account of how a number of reflexes might
be blended or combined to constitute an instance of orderly behavior. A
popular “solution” had been to divide the nervous system into a hierarchy,
and to posit some higher mechanism to regulate (inhibit or control) reflexes.
Merleau-Ponty is skeptical of this route, for two related reasons. First, he is
28Citations provide the page-number in Fisher’s (1963) English translation, followed by
the page number in the later French editions (those with a preface by de Waelhens).
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opposed to any hierarchical conception of the nervous system (SC , p.22/19,
citing Goldstein 1934). Thus he remarks:
“[T]he classical conception is maintained [by positing regulation]
only if the regulation is localized in certain devices comparable
to reflex arcs. But it does not seem to be exclusively bound up
with cerebral activity... nor does it seem explicable moreover in
each place by automatic devices of association or disjunction...
Depending on the case, each part of the nervous system can in
turn appear to be inhibiting or inhibited...
In the final analysis, inhibition and control do not explain nerve
functioning. They themselves presuppose a process which regu-
lates their distribution” (SC , pp.31-32/31, my emph.).
Merleau-Ponty takes the neuroscientific data he reviews (and which I omit) to
suggest there is no hierarchical organization in the nervous system, no reflex-
like “control circuit” which automatically regulates lesser circuits. This is the
first reason why Merleau-Ponty thinks the classical view will not work. The
concept of the reflex failed to describe the nervous system in the first attempt,
since it could not account for orderly behavior. The classical theorist then re-
posited the reflex “further in,” in the guise of an automatic control circuit. If
this too fails, the classical theorist must again scramble to actually apply the
concept which is intended to get their explanation off the ground. Merleau-
Ponty quips that this strategy will
“have to be reinitiated indefinitely; and the solution will always
be deferred, never furnished, until the moment when a principle
which constitutes the order [un principe qui constitue l’ordre]
instead of undergoing it has been introduced...” (SC , p.33/33).
This latter claim helps us see the second, deeper reason why Merleau-Ponty
thinks the classical view will not work. It is because a classical view simply
cannot account for orderly phenomena (forms, structures, Gestalten). Order
cannot be causally produced in the classical view: the output of any causal
process will always just be a new juxtaposition of atoms. As a result, the
puzzle is not to find the right kind of regulation (inhibition, control, etc.)
to cause order. Instead, as Merleau-Ponty phrases it: “the problem of order
has no meaning if we make it a second problem of causality” (SC , p.50/53).
Merleau-Ponty thinks we need no new kind or concept of causation in order
Sheredos Merleau-Ponty vs. the New Mechanists
Please cite only the version published in Synthese
31
to explain order – “causation” is not ambiguous, and has no secret sense
we must work out. (Contrast Leuridan’s (2011) claims, reviewed on p.23
above).29 We must rather seek to understand a wholly novel, acausal kind
of co-dependency involved in the constitution of order (SC , p.154/167).
This is not Merleau-Ponty’s full view: we have not yet clarified his dis-
agreement with the Gestaltists. But we can already spell out how Merleau-
Ponty’s view of Gestalten anticipates much of the dispute regarding mecha-
nism’s organization. The notion of order we’ve been discussing is precisely
the sort of organization which renders some systems Gestalten rather than
mere and-summations. As Merleau-Ponty puts it – flirting with the idea of
both merely physical and biological Gestalten – “in a soap bubble as in an
organism, what happens at each point is determined by what happens in all
the others. But this is the definition of order” (SC , p.131/141-142). Just this
sort of interdependence of working parts is what the New Mechanists have
called a mechanisms’ “active organization” (S2.3 above). Merleau-Ponty’s
insistence that the constitution of order cannot be explained by (classical)
causation anticipates the widespread insistence by Mechanists that consti-
tutive relevance should not be analyzed as a causal relation (S3.2 above).
In addition, Merleau-Ponty’s criticism against the classical atomist echoes
some other claims by New Mechanists. As discussed above, both Fagan
(2012, 2015) and Glennan (2017) seem to endorse a reductive or decomposi-
tional approach to constitutive relevance, according to which it is ultimately
certain features that parts possess in isolation (e.g., their “meshing proper-
ties” or “affinities”) which will enable us to analyze constitutive relevance.
Merleau-Ponty makes clear a basic constraint on any such approach: we will
not be able to account for the orderly organization of mechanisms in terms of
the parts unless we have an ontologically rich conception of the parts, which
invests them with some principle which enables them to constitute the order
29As I have argued elsewhere (Sheredos, 2017) there has been persistent confusion in the
secondary literature on Merleau-Ponty on this point. A popular “enactivist” reading of
Merleau-Ponty supposes that he supports the claim that “a dynamical gestalt [is] composed
of processes that unfold over time, and [is] characterized by recursive reciprocal causal
relations” (Gallagher, 2017, p.10). The New Mechanists’ debate over constitutive relevance
– especially Krickel (2018) – has likewise been pressed into service to clarify the enactivist’s
core thesis of “causal constitution” (Gallagher, 2018). By my lights, the causal-enactivist
conception is at odds with both the aims of New Mechanists, and Merleau-Ponty’s own
view – at least as this is expressed in SC .
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which is our explanandum. The classical view, with its limited ontological
resources, could not make such a view workable.
We can go further in drawing connections by considering one of Merleau-
Ponty’s central claims about the relationship between an organism’s “reac-
tions” and its surrounding world (milieu or “situation”). He understands
these as two moments of the indivisible Gestalt which is perceived behav-
ior. This bears emphasis: for Merleau-Ponty, an organism’s behavior (as
we perceive it) is not “a thing in-itself (en soi) which would exist, partes
extra partes, in the nervous system or in the body; rather... behavior [is]
an embodied dialectic which radiates over a milieu immanent to it (SC ,
pp.161/174). Both the organism and its milieu are “parts” of one whole
perceived Gestalt : behavior is not localized to a classical, physical body.30
The acting organism’s body, in this sense, is not a classical juxtaposition of
atoms, but rather an object of perception: what Merleau-Ponty calls a “phe-
nomenal body” (SC , p.156/169). With this in mind, consider the following
claim about behavior:
“Situation and reaction are linked internally by their common
participation in a structure in which the mode of activity proper
to the organism is expressed. Hence they cannot be placed one
after the other as cause and effect: they are two moments of
a circular process [d’un processus circulaire]... If behavior is a
‘form,’ one cannot even designate in it that which depends on
each one of the internal and external conditions taken separately,
since their variations will be expressed in the form by a global
and indivisible effect” (SC , pp.130-131/140-141).
The claim made here, in reference to behavior, is indicative of Merleau-
Ponty’s conception of all Gestalten. The claim is that any variation in the
“parts” of a Gestalt is co-constitutive with an alteration of the whole form.
This is tantamount to the core notion of “fat-handedness,” and the claim that
manipulating any working part of a mechaanism (Gestalt) co-constitutively
manipulates the whole (S3.2 above). As is clear from the passage, Merleau-
Ponty likewise insists that these relations are not causal.
30This Gestalt is thus also temporally extended, like a melody – a central example of
the Gestaltists besides the more clearly spatial cases, such as ambiguous figures.
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These connections, I hope, make it clear that Merleau-Ponty’s decades-old
claims aboutGestalten effectively summarize the basic “tension” (S3.2 above)
which has driven the New Mechanists’ debate over constitutive relevance.
Merleau-Ponty’s concern, like that of most New Mechanists, was how to
understand the constitution of order or organization in a non-causal way.
Here Merleau-Ponty’s disagreement with the Gestaltists comes to the fore.
The Gestaltists reified material Gestalten, abandoning a classical worldly
ontology of physicalistic atoms in favor of an ontology of Gestalten. This,
in Merleau-Ponty’s view, was an error: Gestalten were rather only to be un-
derstood as mind-dependent phenomena which we experience in perceptual
consciousness. He offered several arguments for this view. One argument
took the Gestaltists to task for failing to offer an adequate ontological analy-
sis of materialGestalten. Ko¨hler’s (1920) discussion of physical (electrostatic)
Gestalten was a target here. In Merleau-Ponty’s view, Ko¨hler’s reliance on
intuitive metaphors was telling:
“That in the final analysis form [i.e., Gestalten] cannot be defined
in terms of reality but in terms of knowledge, not as a thing of the
physical world but as a perceived whole, is explicitly recognized
by Koehler when he writes that the order in a form “rests... on
the fact that each local event, one could almost say, ‘dynamically
knows’ the others.”* It is not an accident that, in order to express
this presence of each moment to the other, Koehler comes up with
the term ‘knowledge.’ A unity of this type can be found only in an
object of knowledge... This unity is the unity of perceived objects.
[Thus e.g.] A colored circle which I look at is completely modified
in its physiognomy by an irregularity which removes something
of its circular character and makes it an imperfect circle” (SC ,
pp.143-144/155, footnoting Ko¨hler 1920 p.180 at the asterisk).
Merleau-Ponty here makes three claims.
M1. If this kind of anthropomorphic analogy is the best we can offer to
analyze Gestalten, we do not have an adequate realistic, ontological
analysis of them;
M2. the reason why we are led to invoke this sort of analogy is that we are
(dimly, but correctly) implicitly regardingGestalten as mind-dependent
phenomena we experience in perceptual consciousness,
because
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M3. the sort of unity which is imperfectly expressed by these anthropomor-
phic analogies is solely possessed by perceived wholes.
I take it most of us would grant M1. Merleau-Ponty’s point here is relevant to
some New Mechanists: see the discussion in S3.2 above of Fagan’s (2015) con-
ception of “jointness,” on analogy with social action, and Glennan’s (2017)
claim that parts have “affinities” to “seek out” other parts to interact with.
These analogies are plausibly no substitute for a realistic, ontological analysis
of constitutive relevance and mechanistic organization.
M2 and M3 are more contentious, and they connect with Merleau-Ponty’s
second argument against the Gestaltists. I provide a sketch of it here, and
will elaborate further in S4.2 below. Merleau-Ponty’s key contention was that
we do not discover material Gestalten in the advancement of science. We be-
gin with an intuitive apprehension of perceptual-phenomenal Gestalten – for
example, a perception of a phenomenal body exhibiting behavior. Our intu-
itive grasp on the phenomenon, through perception, pre-dates our hard-won
scientific understanding of it, and the whole purpose of scientific endeavor
is to make the perceived world more precisely intelligible (SC , p.145/157).
While we can come to understand a perceptual-phenomenal Gestalt more
precisely through scientific research, we do not discover that entities in the
mind-independent world are really, in themselves, material Gestalten. Both
universal laws of nature (SC , p.139/150) and mathematical formalisms (SC ,
p.143/155) might have some applicability to perceived phenomena, enabling
us to understand them more precisely, but neither licenses us in reifying
Gestalten as mind-independent entities. Because the aim of scientific inves-
tigation is to make phenomena intelligible, Merleau-Ponty thinks it is inco-
herent to regard them as mind-independent things in themselves: a Gestalt
should be regarded as a moment of a dialectic, not as an “element of the
world” which exists independent of consciousness (SC , pp.142/153). This
division between perceived phenomena and elements of the world is the root
of Merleau-Ponty’s claim M3, and this in turn supports his claim M2.
Many contemporary thinkers would likely not uphold Merleau-Ponty’s
division between elements of the world and perceived phenomena. Moreover,
most Mechanists would likely not agree that our starting-point for mech-
anistic explanation is a simple perception at all: prototypical cases in the
New Mechanistic literature in philosophy of biology are microscopic mech-
anisms and explanandum phenomena (e.g., within single cells). As a re-
sult, Merleau-Ponty’s own arguments against material Gestalten will not win
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many adherents. However, I believe we can see our way to a plausible exten-
sion of Merleau-Ponty’s argument. The core of Merleau-Ponty’s argument
against the Gestaltists is that the theoretical understanding of the world sci-
ence provides does not reveal any mind-independent entities in the world as
having the organization of Gestalten. The Gestaltists had themselves some-
times suggested this. In his analysis of electrostatic Gestalten, Ko¨hler was
forced to admit that no mathematical formula on its own dictates that its
intended referent is a material Gestalt : the same quantitative apparatus can
always be used in a way that leaves out the qualitative characteristics of
a Gestalt – for example, arbitrary values could be assigned to any formula
(SC , p.141/152). Ko¨hler thus advocated devising some new mathematical
sign which, appended to a given formula, would indicate that it should be
given a qualitative interpretation as representing a material Gestalt (Ko¨hler,
1920, p.105). The key issue here – the issue of whether and how our theo-
retical understanding of some system (e.g., as represented in a mathematical
formula) might justify the reification of it as an organized whole – can be
divorced from Merleau-Ponty’s specific commitment to M2 and M3. In fact,
a similar view has already been considered by some New Mechanists.
4.2. Extending Merleau-Ponty’s view
Bechtel (2015) has argued that biological mechanisms (the mainstay of
Mechanistic explanation) are typically “scale-free,” meaning not only that
there is no well-delineated temporal window in which activities occur, but
also that there is no well-delineated spatial region in which the mechanism
can be said to exist. He proposes that the “mechanisms” (and their parts,
and their activities) which are hypothesized to exist in offering a Mechanistic
explanation should be viewed as idealizations, where an idealization “involves
the introduction of simplifying falsehoods” – e.g., the falsehood of discrete
spatiotemporal boundaries (ibid., p.85). A Mechanistic explanation can only
be accurate to a “first approximation,” and the idealizations involved always
make it the case that the hypothesized mechanism “fails to give a fully correct
account of the phenomenon occurring in nature” (ibid., p.85). It is worth
repeating in full the take-home message Bechtel offers readers:
“[T]he mechanisms proposed are posits of the scientists devel-
oping the explanation. They do not exist in nature as well de-
lineated entities. The goal of mechanistic explanation is not to
represent mechanisms as they exist independently of scientists.
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Rather, it is to show what phenomena, the parts and operations
selected by the scientists, operating in the time-window they con-
sider, can largely account for. While this may limit the aspira-
tions of both scientists pursuing mechanistic explanations and
philosophers characterizing their project, it does not challenge
the value of pursuing mechanistic explanation and in the process
idealizing mechanisms by delineating boundaries that do not exist
in nature” (ibid., p.86.)
Bechtel’s is an especially robust variant of an epistemic approach to Mech-
anistic explanation. The aim of scientific explanation, on this view, is to
make phenomena more precisely intelligible. As seen in the passage above,
this need not require uncovering the way the world really is. The ontic ap-
proach to explanation, by contrast, maintains that epistemic explanation is
parasitic upon identifying so-called “ontic explanations” – the things in the
world which cause, constitute, or are otherwise responsible for phenomena.
The scale-freeness of mechanisms makes things difficult for the ontic camp: if
we cannot identify the spatiotemporal location of mechanisms, it is difficult
to (a) incur ontological commitment to them as “ontic explanations,” and
(b) demand such ontological commitment as a success-condition of epistemic
explanation.
Bechtel’s argument has two foci. (1) The number and character of in-
teractions between mechanisms and their environments makes it difficult to
identify the mechanism’s spatial boundaries, such that any precise hypothesis
about its boundaries will be an idealization (2015, S3). (2) Following Marom
(2010), the time-scales of mechanistic processes (e.g., parts’ activities, or the
whole mechanism’s y-ing) are not characteristically well-defined, such that
making any claim to the effect that these events occur within a well-defined
temporal window will involve idealization (2015, S5).
I suggest that Merleau-Ponty’s basic claim against the Gestaltists may be
understood along similar lines. His claim is that our scientific understand-
ing of the world always involves idealization. Specifically, the theoretical
division of perceived Gestalten into “parts” which may be to some extent
understood in isolation (e.g., they can be represented using distinct variables
in mathematical formulae) is an idealization, involving a falsehood of decom-
posability or aggregation. This idealized understanding is not nothing, but
once we have attained it, it can offer no grounds for reifying material Gestal-
ten. (Recall that here, Ko¨hler suggesting appending some novel symbol to
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mathematical formulas to enforce a qualitative interpretation of them as rep-
resenting a Gestalt, as if to say: “and this simplifying idealization represents
a real, material Gestalt – though nothing in it shows that it does.”)
We might disagree with Merleau-Ponty’s own specific view that the start-
ing point for scientific investigation is always perception, and that only per-
ceived wholes exhibit Gestalt structure. This does not seem to diminish his
main point against the Gestaltists: if the Gestaltists implicitly pursue ana-
lytical decompositions of some system which (by their own lights) ought to
be understood holistically, then they labor under idealization. The idealized
understanding they acquire is not nothing, but they cannot simply append an
endorsement of holism as an afterthought, reifying organization on a whim, if
their decompositional strategy has done nothing to investigate it. If scientific
investigation can offer only an idealized understanding of allegedly material
Gestalten which does not itself capture their holistic character, then it cannot
on its own incur ontological commitment to the mind-independent existence
of material Gestalten.
If the Gestaltists admit they they have presupposed from the outset that
the system of study is an organized whole, then some story must be told about
where that presupposition comes from. Here Merleau-Ponty’s answer is per-
ception, and his claim is precisely that the Gestaltists have misunderstood
perceptual-phenomenal Gestalten, which are mind-dependent phenomena of
na¨ıve perception, and have effectively reified them as mind-independent ma-
terial Gestalten (SC , p.144/156). Setting Merleau-Ponty’s appeal to per-
ception aside, the core problem is this: if the Gestaltists have presupposed
that the systems of study are organized wholes, they must then admit that a
scientific understanding of that system does not offer us a means to discover
material Gestalten at all.
4.3. Merleau-Ponty’s Implicit Critique of the New Mechanists
With all this in place, Merleau-Ponty’s implicit critique of many New
Mechanists is fairly straightforward: it is a special application of his core
critique of the Gestaltists, and what I shall say in this subsection to spell it
out closely mirrors what I said in the last.
On the one hand, New Mechanists have been championing a decomposi-
tional style of explanation, which labors under the idealization (or heuristic)
that mechanisms’ parts can be studied in isolation. On the other hand,
New Mechanists have sought to append an endorsement of holism (in their
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claims about mechanisms’ organization and their parts’ constitutive rele-
vance). These are not strictly incompatible, but they are disjoint: the decom-
positional strategy does nothing to clarify whence an endorsement of holism
should arise. If we do indeed take this second step then, as I argued in S2, we
embrace ontological commitment to material Gestalten. Yet, as I reviewed in
SS3.2 & 3.3, no ontological analysis of mechanisms’ organization has attained
consensus. At present, many New Mechanists are promoting ontological com-
mitment to certain holistic, organizational features of mechanisms, when (a)
the core strategies of Mechanistic explanation offer us little to understand
those features, and (b) little has been said to even enable us to identify the
features to which ontological commitment is encouraged. Mechanists can-
not simply reify organization as an afterthought, on a whim. If Mechanistic
explanation can offer only an idealized understanding of those alleged ontic
structures called mechanisms which does not capture their holistic character,
then it simply cannot incur ontological commitment to the mind-independent
existence of organized mechanisms.
If Mechanists admit that they have presupposed from the outset that
mechanisms are organized wholes, then some story must be told about where
that presupposition comes from. Minimally, Mechanists must then admit
that mainstream Mechanistic explanation has not offered us a means to dis-
cover mechanisms’ mind-independent organization at all.
It is possible that future work might resolve these issues. An ontolog-
ical analysis of mechanistic organization might be proposed which quickly
gains favor, and which makes clear how scientists’ research strategies (“in-
terlevel experiments”) enable them to discover organized mechanisms. Yet
caution is suggested by the wide variety of approaches toward constitutive
relevance that have been taken up in the short time since it became a focus
of inquiry. Understanding Merleau-Ponty’s critique of the Gestaltists sug-
gests a conservative null hypothesis: until such time as a suitable, realistic,
ontological analysis of constitutive relevance and mechanistic organization is
offered which addresses these concerns, it is more modest to suppose that
mechanisms, qua organized unities, need not really exist in themselves, in a
mind-independent nature. We instead begin from an assumption that mech-
anisms are organized wholes.
A story must then be told – by Mechanists – about where that assumption
comes from. But on this view, that assumption need not be discharged by
some empirical demonstration that there exist ontic structures called mecha-
nisms which, in themselves, possess some unique organization. The assump-
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tion rather does its work as part of an epistemic strategy of explanation: it
specifies in advance some constraints on how we seek to understand phenom-
ena when we pursue a Mechanistic explanation. On this view, the debate
over constitutive relevance amounts to some first forays into elaborating a
framework for how we might make mechanisms’ (presupposed) organization
more precisely intelligible. Whether or not such a framework is successfully
clarified, our pre-scientific apprehension of mechanisms’ organization will al-
ways pre-date our idealized scientific understanding of it.
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